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Abstract. Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the
problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place
very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of
prior-free auction and focus on designing a simple mechanism that always
allocates the item. Rather than designing sophisticated pricing methods
like prior literature, we design better allocation methods. In particular,
we propose quasi-proportional allocation methods in which the probabil-
ity that an item is allocated to a bidder depends (quasi-proportionally)
on the bids.
We prove that corresponding games for both all-pay and winners-pay
quasi-proportional mechanisms admit pure Nash equilibria and this equi-
librium is unique. We also give an algorithm to compute this equilibrium
in polynomial time. Further, we show that the revenue of the auctioneer
is promisingly high compared to the ultimate, i.e., the highest value of
any of the bidders, and show bounds on the revenue of equilibria both
analytically, as well as using experiments for specific quasi-proportional
functions. This is the first known revenue analysis for these natural mech-
anisms (including the special case of proportional mechanism which is
common in network resource allocation problems).
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1 Introduction
Consider the following motivating example. There is a single item (in our case,
an ad slot) to be sold by auction. We have two bidders A and B, A with valuation
bA = 100 and B with valuation bB = 1. Who should we allocate the item and
what is the price we charge? In the equilibrium of the first price auction, A wins
by bidding 1 + ǫ. We (the auctioneer) get revenue of 1 + ǫ for some small ǫ > 0.
In the second price auction, A wins and pays bB + ǫ = 1+ ǫ for some ǫ > 0 and
the revenue is 1 + ǫ, equivalent to the first price revenue. So, neither generates
revenue anywhere close to the maximum valuation of max{bA, bB} = 100. Is
there a mechanism that will extract revenue close to the maximum valuation
of bidders in equilibrium? What is the formal way to address this situation
where valuations are vastly different? In this paper, we look at this problem in
a general setting of prior-free auction design, and study revenue maximization.
Further, we propose a class of natural allocations and analyze them for revenue
and equilibrium properties under different pricing methods.
Our motivation arises from allocation of ad slots on the Internet. Consider
the example of sponsored search where when a user enters a phrase in a search
engine, an auction is run among advertisers who target that phrase to determine
which ads will be shown to the user. There are several instances where the
underlying value is vastly different for the different participating advertisers.
For example, the phrase “shoes” may be targeted by both high end as well as
low end shoe retailers and may have vastly different values, budgets or margins in
their business. Thus their bids will likely be vastly different. In another example,
we have display advertising, where users who visit certain web sites are shown
“display” ads like images, banners or even video. Then, depending on the history
of the user — e.g., someone who is new to the website versus one who has been
previously — different display advertisers value the user significantly differently,
and therefore their bid values will be vastly different. In both these motivating
scenarios, there are other issues to model and this paper is not a study of these
applications, but rather, a study of a fundamental abstract problem inherent in
these applications.
Prior-free Auctions and Revenue Maximization. Revenue Maximization is a cen-
tral issue in mechanism design and has been studied extensively. A standard way
for maximizing revenue is to derive some value profile from the bids, calculate
bidder-specific reserve price, and run a second price auction [16,2,18]. In the
example above, say both buyers’ value comes from some random distribution.
Then, if we know this distribution, we can calculate a reserve price r using this
distribution, and run a second-price auction with this reserve price r, i.e, allo-
cate the item to the highest bidder A and charge A the max{bB, r} if bA ≥ r
(else, the item remains unsold); here, bA and bB’s are bids by A and B resp.
Many such mechanisms are known; these mechanisms are incentive-compatible
(that is, each bidder has no incentive to lie), and even additionally revenue-
optimal, perhaps as the number of bidders goes to infinity. Such methods that
rely on some assumptions over the values of bidders, i.e, that the values are drawn
from some distribution (known or unknown), are called prior-aware mechanisms.
Prior-aware mechanisms are popular in Economics. Still, from mathematical and
practical point, the following questions arise:
1. Are there prior-free mechanisms that work independent of the value distribu-
tions of bidders?
This question is of inherent interest: what can be accomplished without
knowledge of the value distributions. This is also a question that is motivated
by practice. In practical applications, a way to use prior-aware mechanisms is
to rely on running the same auction many times, and then use the history of
bids to “machine learn” the values. Of course in practice the parameters of the
auction change (users evolve), there is sparse data (query phrases are rare), ad-
vertisers strategize in complex ways and their values change over time (as they
learn their own business feedbacks better), or worse, even if the machine learn-
ing methods converge, they provide “approximate” value distributions and we
need to understand the mechanisms under approximate distributions. As a re-
sult, there are challenges in applying prior-aware mechanisms in practice and a
natural question is if they can be avoided.
2. Are there prior-free mechanisms that work without reserve-prices?
This question is a more nuanced concern. First, when there is a reserve price,
the item may remain unsold in instances when bA < r. This may not be desirable
in general. For example, in display ads, if an ad slot is unsold, the webpage has
to find a different template without that ad slot or fill in that space with backup
ads. Also, when the item is not sold, the outcome is not efficient, since the value
to the advertisers (defined the value of time to the winner) is not maximized.
And in an ever more nuanced note, advertisers do not find it transparent when
the mechanism has bidder-specific reserve prices, and often see it as a bias. This
is more so when each advertiser may get many different bidder-specific reserve
prices corresponding to different search phrases or display ad locations as implied
by the general prior-aware mechanisms above. More discussions on mechanisms
that always assign the item can be found in [14].
Prior-free revenue-maximizing mechanisms have been developed for vari-
ous auction settings [7,10,15]. Lower bounds show that prior-free truthful auc-
tion cannot achieve revenue comparable to the revenue-optimal auctions with
prior [7,10,15], and the mechanism in [15] achieves the best possible revenue
among prior-free truthful mechanisms. Still, these mechanisms work by setting
reserve prices, and do not address the second concern above.
Our Contribution. We study a simple, practical prior-free mechanism that
always allocates the item. In contrast to the approaches described above that
allocate the item to the highest bidder, but determine nontrivial prices, we focus
on the allocation problem and allocate the item probabilistically. Our contribu-
tions are as follows.
1.We propose a quasi-proportional allocation scheme where the probability that
a bidder wins the item depends (quasi-proportionally) on the bids.
As an example, for two bidders with bids bA and bB, we allocate the item
to bidder A with probability
√
bA√
bA+
√
bB
, and to B otherwise. More generally in
the presence of n bidders with bid vector (b1, . . . , bn), we consider a continu-
ous and concave function w, and set the probability of winning for bidder i
to w(bi)P
1≤j≤n w(bj)
. Thus the winner of the auction is not necessarily the bidder
with the highest bid. The special case when w(bi) = bi is known as the pro-
portional allocation scheme and has been studied previously e.g., in [11,13,9].
We study both payment methods that are common in auction theory, namely,
all-pay (where all bidders pay their bid no matter if they win the item or not) as
well as the winner-pay (only the winner pays her bid to the auctioneer) methods.
2. We study Nash equilibria of quasi-proportional mechanisms.
2.1.We prove that the corresponding games for both all-pay and winners-pay
quasi-proportional mechanisms admit pure Nash equilibria and this equilibrium
is unique. We also give an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in polynomial
time.
2.2. We show that the revenue of the auctioneer is promisingly high, while
not losing much in the efficiency of the allocation. More precisely, we compare
the revenue of such mechanisms against the ultimate: maxi vi, the highest value
of any of the bidders, and show bounds on the revenue of equilibria in such
mechanisms. For example, consider an auction among two bidders with values
vA = α and vB = 1 respectively. The revenue of equilibria for both first-price
and second-price auctions approaches 1. Instead, with quasi-proportional mech-
anisms, (i) for the all-pay mechanism with function w(x) = xγ where γ ≤ 1,
the revenue of equilibrium is γα1−γ , and (ii) for winners-pay mechanism, where
α >> 1, we show that the revenue of all-pay and winners-pay mechanisms with
functions w(x) = x and w(x) =
√
x are Ω(α
1
2 ) and Ω(α
2
3 ) respectively. For the
case of more than two bidders, we first show preliminary results for the revenue
of various (specific) valuation vectors for the case that the number of buyers
tends to ∞, and then we present numerical results for the revenue of equilibria
for some key example functions such as w(x) =
√
x and w(x) = x. Taken to-
gether, these results give a set of analytical and experimental tools to bound the
revenue of these mechanisms against the maxivi benchmark.
Proportional allocation, a special case of our quasi-proportional allocation,
has been studied extensively in literature, in particular for efficiency analysis.
But even for this rather natural allocation method, we do not know of any prior
work on revenue analysis.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a sealed-bid auction of a single item for a set A = {1, . . . , n} of n
potential buyers. Let the value of these n buyers for the single item be v1 ≥
v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. Throughout this paper, we assume that v1 = α ≥ 1, and vn = 1.
Consider a concave function w : R → R (e.g., w(x) = √x). Each buyer i ∈ A
bids an amount bi to get the item. A quasi-proportional mechanism allocates the
item in a probabilistic manner. In particular, the item is allocated to exactly one
of the buyers, and the probability that buyer i gets the item is w(bi)P
j∈A w(bj)
. For
a bid vector (b1, . . . , bn), let b−i be the bid vector excluding the bid of buyer i.
We study the following two variants of quasi-proportional mechanisms with two
payment schemes.
1. All-pay Quasi-proportional Mechanisms. The allocation rule in this
mechanism is described above. For the payment scheme in this mechanism,
each buyer pays her bid (no matter if he receives the item or not). This
mechanism is ex-ante individually rational, but not ex-post individually ra-
tional. Given the above payment scheme, in the all-pay mechanism, we can
write the utility of buyer i, as a function of the bids vector as follows:
ui(b) = ui(bi, b−i) = vi
w(bi)∑
j∈A w(bj)
− bi.
2. Winners-pay Quasi-proportional Mechanisms. The allocation rule in
this mechanism is described above. For the payment scheme in this mech-
anism, the buyer who receives the item pays her bid, and the other buyers
pay zero. This mechanism is ex-post individually rational. As a result buyer
i’s utility as a function of the bids is
ui(b) = ui(bi, b−i) =
w(bi)∑
j∈A w(bj)
(vi − bi).
We are interested in Nash equilibria1 of the above mechanisms. We consider
Nash equilibria of normal-form games with complete information. In the corre-
sponding normal-form game of the quasi-proportional mechanism, the strategy
of each buyer i is her bid. Formally, a bid vector (b∗1, . . . , b
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium
if for any buyer i and any bid b′i, we have ui(b
∗) = u(b∗i , b
∗
−i) ≥ ui(b′i, b∗−i).
In addition, we study efficiency and revenue of quasi-proportional mecha-
nisms: (i) the efficiency of a bid vector (b1, . . . , bn) is the expected valuation of
buyers, i.e.,
∑
i∈A(vi
w(bi)P
j∈A w(bj)
), and (ii) the revenue of a bid vector (b1, . . . , bn)
is the expected revenue for the auctioneer given this bid vector, i.e.,
∑
i∈A bi, in
the all-pay auction, and
∑
i∈A(bi
w(bi)P
j∈A w(bi)
), in the winner-pay auction.
3 All-pay quasi-proportional mechanism: A warm-up
example
To demonstrate the kind of analyses we do, and to develop the intuition, we
present a study of revenue properties of an all-pay quasi-proportional mechanism
for two buyers for functions w(t) = tγ where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter. Let the
bid of the first buyer be y = b1 and the bid of the second buyer x = b2. As
1 Throughout this paper, we study pure Nash equilibria and not mixed Nash equilibria.
mentioned earlier, we assume v1 = α and v2 = 1 are the valuations of the two
buyers. The expected utility of the second buyer is x
γ
xγ+yγ − x, and the utility of
the first buyer is α y
γ
xγ+yγ − y.
For a fixed y, the second buyer’s utility is a concave and increasing function of
his bid, in the region [0,∞) and similarly, for a fixed x, the first buyer’s utility is
concave and increasing in his bid. Hence, in equilibrium, both buyers have their
first derivative nullified: ∂∂x
(
xγ
xγ+yγ − x
)
= 0, and ∂∂y
(
α y
γ
xγ+yγ − y
)
= 0. Thus,
we get that
γ(x)γ−1yγ
(xγ + yγ)2
= 1 and
αγ(y)γ−1xγ
(xγ + yγ)2
= 1
From which it follows that in equilibrium yx = α. Now, combining with the
second equality, we get that αγ(αx)
γ−1xγ
((1+αγ)xγ)2 = 1 or
αγ(αx)γ−1
(1+αγ)2xγ = 1, and we get that
x = γα
γ
(1+αγ)2 ; y = α
γαγ
(1+αγ )2 . Hence,
x+ y = (1 + α)
γαγ
(1 + αγ)2
α→∞−→ γα1−γ .
Moreover, as yx = α, the probability that buyer 2 receives the item is
1
1+αγ ,
and otherwise buyer 1 gets the item. Thus, the efficiency of this mechanism is
1+αγ+1
1+αγ . In particular, as α → ∞, the efficiency is arbitrarily close to α. The
most efficient allocation rule is to assign the item to buyer 1, and get efficiency
α. That completes the analysis and shows that
Theorem 1. The all-pay quasi-proportional mechanism with two buyers guar-
antees a total revenue of (1 + α) γα
γ
(1+αγ)2 and expected efficiency of
1+αγ+1
1+αγ in
equilibrium. In particular, for a large enough α, the revenue is γα1−γ and effi-
ciency is arbitrarily close to α.
4 Equilibrium: Existence and Uniqueness
In this section, we establish the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria of
both the all-pay and winners-pay quasi-proportional auctions.
Definition 1 (from [6]). A game is socially concave if the following holds:
1. There exists a strict convex combination of the utility functions which is a
concave function. Formally, there exists an n-tuple (λi)i∈A , λi > 0, and∑
i∈A λi = 1, such that g(x) =
∑
i∈A λiui(x) is a concave function in x.
2. The utility function of each buyer i, is convex in the actions of the other
buyers. I.e., for every si ∈ Si the function ui(si, x−i) is convex in x−i ∈ S−i,
where Si is the strategy space of agent i, and S−i =
∏
j∈A,j 6=i Sj.
Rosen [17] defined the diagonal concavity property for concave games, and
showed that when it holds, the Nash equilibrium of the game is unique. Even
Dar et al [6] showed that if one of the properties 1 and 2 holds with strict
concavity or convexity, respectively, then the diagonal concavity property holds.
Now, we show that a quasi-proportional auction is a socially concave game. The
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium would follow as a corollary of [17] and [6].
Lemma 1. Let Γ = (A, {ui}i∈A)) be an all-pay quasi-proportional auction, with
utility functions for buyer i, ui() defined as above and assume that the weight
function w() is a concave function, and that the strategy of each buyer is re-
stricted to a compact set [Bmin, Bmax], where 0 < Bmin < Bmax <∞. Then Γ is
a socially-concave game.
Proof. To show property 1 holds, consider the weighted social welfare function
g(), where the utility of buyer i is weighted by λi =
∑
j∈A vj/vi.
g(b) ≡
∑
i∈A
λiui(b) =
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈A vj
vi
(
vi
w(bi)∑
j∈A w(bj)
− bi
)
=
∑
j∈A
vj
∑
i
w(bi)∑
j∈A w(bj)
−
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈A vj
vi
bi =
∑
j∈A
vj −
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈A vj
vi
bi (4.1)
The first term in 4.1 is a constant and the second term is linear in b. Thus,
g() is a concave (linear) function of b. To show that property 2 holds, we first
fix a buyer i and an action bi ∈ [Bmin, Bmax]. Now, consider the utility of buyer
i as a function of the actions b−i, when buyer i’s action is bi:
u
(bi)
i (b−i) ≡ ui(bi, b−i) = vi
w(bi)
w(bi) +
∑
j 6=i w(bj)
− bi
To show that u
(bi)
i (b−i) is a convex function, it suffices to show that the function
w(b−i) =
c
c+
∑
j 6=i w(bj)
,
is a convex function of the vector b−i. Let g(b−i) =
∑
j 6=i w(bj). The function
g(b−i) is concave in b−i as it is the sum of n − 1 concave functions. Let h(z) ≡
c
c+z . The function h() is convex in z and decreasing in R+. The function w =
h(g(b−i)) is a convex function as a composition of a convex decreasing function
with a concave function: For every two vectors b0, b1 and t ∈ [0, 1] we have that
g(tb0 + (1− t)b1) ≥ tg(b0) + (1− t)g(b1), by the concavity of g(). Consequently,
h(g(tb0+(1− t)b1)) ≤ h(tg(b0)+(1− t)g(b1)) ≤ th(g(b0))+(1− t)h(g(b1), where
the first inequality follows from the fact h(z) is decreasing when z > 0, and the
second inequality follows the convexity of h.
A similar lemma holds for winner-pay auctions, with weight function of the
form w(x) = xγ , where 0 < γ ≤ 1.
Lemma 2. Let Γ = (A, {ui}i∈A)) be an winner-pay quasi-proportional auction,
with utility functions for user i, ui() defined as above and assume that the weight
function w(x) = xγ , where 0 < γ ≤ 1, and that the strategy of each user is
restricted to a compact set [Bmin, Bmax], where 0 < Bmin < Bmax <∞. Then Γ
is a socially concave game.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can restrict user i bids to be less than his
value vi. To show property 2 holds, we notice that for every fixed 0 < bi < vi,
we have that vi − bi > 0, and consequently, user i utility function
u
(bi)
i (b−i) =
w(bi)
w(bi) +
∑
j 6=i w(bj)
(vi − bi) = c w(bi)
w(bi) +
∑
j 6=i w(bj)
,
for some c > 0. The last term was shown to be a convex function in the proof of
Lemma 1.
To show property 1 holds, we use the same weight vector as in the proof of
Lemma 1. In this case, the weighted social welfare is not an affine function, but
it can be shown that it is a convex function when w(x) = xγ , when 0 < γ < 1.
5 Revenue of Quasi-proportional Mechanisms
In section 3, we computed the revenue of all-pay quasi-proportional mechanisms
for two buyers, and functions w(x) = xγ . In this section, we first observe general
properties for the revenue of equilibria of quasi-proportional mechanisms. Then,
we focus on two special functions and prove tight bounds on the revenue of the
winners-pay mechanisms. The utility function ui(bi, b−i) for both all-pay and
winners-pay mechanisms is a strictly concave function of bi in the region [0,∞]
(as it is a concave function minus a convex function). As a result, in an all-
pay quasi-proportional auction, we have: ∂∂bi
(
w(bi)P
i∈A w(bi)
vi − bi
)
= 0. For a bid
vector, (b1, b2, . . . , bn), let σ(b) =
∑
i∈A w(bi). When clear from context, we let
σ = σ(b). As a result, in equilibrium,
∂
∂bi
(
w(bi)
σ
vi − bi
)
= 0⇒ (w
′(bi)(σ − w(bi))
σ2
)vi = 1⇒ vi = σ
2
w′(bi)(σ − w(bi))(5.1)
Similarly, for winners-pay quasi-proportional mechanisms, the bid of each
buyer i satisfies the following:
∂
∂bi
(
w(bi)(vi − bi)
(σ − w(bi)) + w(bi)
)
=
w′(bi)(σ − w(bi))
σ2
(vi − bi)− w(bi)σ
σ2
= 0⇒
vi = bi +
w(bi)σ
w′(bi)(σ − w(bi)) (5.2)
We will use equations 5.1 and 5.2 in studying the revenue of the equilib-
rium for various functions. In both equations 5.1 and 5.2 for increasing concave
functions like w(x) =
√
x, vi increases as bi increases, i.e, fixing b−i vi is mono-
tonically increasing in terms of bi. This observation leads to the following fact:
For increasing and concave functions w, if v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn, in the equilibrium
bid vector (b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n), we have b
∗
1 ≥ b∗2 ≥ . . . b∗n.
5.1 Revenue for Winners-pay: Two Bidders.
Here, we study winners-pay proportional mechanism for w(x) = x. The utility
of bidder i as a function of the bids is
ui(b) =
bi∑
j∈A bj
(vi − bi) .
Given this utility function, it is easy to see that for vi > 0, in equilibrium
bi > 0. Let’s fix b−i 6= 0. In equilibrium, for every i with bid bi > 0,
∂
∂bi
ui(bi, b−i) = − bi(vi − bi)
(
∑
j∈A bj)2
+
vi − bi∑
j∈A bj
− bi∑
j∈A bj
= −1+(
∑
j 6=i bj)(
∑
j 6=i bj + vi)
(
∑
j∈A bj)2
and we get that in equilibrium,
bi =
√
(
∑
j 6=i
bj)(
∑
j 6=i
bj + vi)−
∑
j 6=i
bj , for every i ∈ A. (5.3)
The revenue from the proportional mechanism as described above is
∑
i∈A
Pr[agent i wins] · bi =
∑
i∈A
bi∑
j∈A bj
bi =
∑
i∈A b
2
i∑
j∈A bj
(5.4)
Consider a setting of two buyers with values v1, v2. We can, without loss of
generality, assume that v2 = 1.
Theorem 2. In the case of two buyers, the revenue from the winners-pay pro-
portional mechanism is O(
√
α), where α = max(v1, v2). Moreover, for arbitrarily
large α, the efficiency of this mechanism is arbitrarily close to α.
Proof. Let R(v1, v2) denote the expected revenue of the auctioneer, when the
values of the agents 1, and 2 are v1, v2 respectively. We assume without loss
of generality that α = v1 > v2 = 1. In this case, notice that the revenue is
dominated by the bid of the first buyer:
R(v1, v2) = b
2
1 + b
2
2
b1 + b2
= b1 + b2 − 2b1b2
b1 + b2
≥ b1 + b2 − 2 (5.5)
where the last inequality follows the observation that in equilibrium, b2 ≤ 1.
Hence, to get a lower bound on the revenue, it suffices to have a lower bound on
b1.
Next, we show that in equilibrium, 1/3 ≤ b2 ≤ 1/2: First, note that using 5.3,
we can easily show that for v1 = v2 = 1, the equilibrium is b1 = b2 = 1/3. In the
equilibrium, b2 =
√
b21 + b1 − b1. Consider the function w(x) =
√
x2 + x − x. It
is increasing in [0,∞) as
w′(x) = −1 + 1 + 2x
2
√
x2 + x
=
−2√x2 + x+ 1 + 2x
2
√
x2 + x
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from
1 + 2x =
√
(1 + 2x)2 =
√
1 + 4x+ 4x2 >
√
4x2 + 4x = 2
√
x2 + x.
As a result, if we fix v2 = 1, then in equilibrium, when v1 ≥ v2, we get
b1 ≥ 1/3. Therefore, b2 which increases as a function of b1 is always greater
than 1/3 in equilibrium. Also, since limx→∞ w(x) → 1/2. Finally, we get b1 =√
b22 + b2v1 − b2 ≥
√
1/9 + v1/3 − 1/3, which proves the theorem. The claim
about efficiency of the mechanism follows from the fact that b1 tends to ∞ as α
tends to ∞.
A similar technique can be used for showing a lower bound on the revenue in
quasi-proportional winner-pay auctions, with weight function w(x) =
√
x, which
asymptotically yields a higher revenue. The proof is left to the appendix.
Theorem 3. The revenue from the winners-pay mechanism for two bidders,
with weight function w(x) =
√
x is O(α2/3), where α = max(v1, v2). Moreover,
for arbitrarily large α, the efficiency of this mechanism is arbitrarily close to α.
We will give numerical results for revenue of other settings like w(x) = x1/4
in Section 6. As for other functions, we prove an upper bound on the revenue of
both all-pay and winners-pay mechanisms for w(x) = log(x+ 1), and show that
the revenue is not more than αlog(α) (See Section B).
5.2 Revenue for many buyers.
Here, we analyze the revenue for two special valuation vectors for n bidders, i.e,
(i) uniform valuation vector, vi = V , and (ii) valuation vector v1 = α, and for
i 6= 1, vi = 1 for i ∈ A. The second type of valuation is important as it captures
examples in which there is a large gap between the highest valuation and value
of other buyers.
Theorem 4. For the uniform valuation vector where vi = V for all i ∈ A, the
revenue in the equilibrium for function w(x) = xγ is n−1n γV for all-pay mecha-
nism, and is V ( 11+( n
n−1
)γ ) for winners-pay mechanism. Moreover, the equilibrium
revenue for uniform valuation vector for function w(x) = log(x+1) for both all-
pay and winners-pay mechanisms is asymptotically Vlog V as V, n→∞ .
Proof. Proofs follows directly from Equations 5.1 and 5.2 by noting that bi = b,
t = nw(b). Also we use the fact that, for all-pay mechanism, the revenue is
nw(bi), and for winners-pay, the revenue is w(b).
Theorem 5. For the valuation vector (α, 1, 1, . . . , 1), the revenue in the equi-
librium of winners-pay quasi-proportional mechanism converges to a constant as
n goes to ∞ for a fixed α. Moreover the revenue of all-pay quasi-proportional
mechanism for function w(x) = xγ goes to zero as n goes to ∞ for a fixed α.
The above theorem shows some bounds on the revenue for a fixed α and as
n tends to ∞. It would be interesting to understand the trade-off between the
revenue for large α and n. In particular, it would be interesting to compute the
revenue for a fixed n as α tends to ∞.
6 An Efficient Algorithm and Numerical Study
In this section, we present an efficient algorithm for computing Nash equilibria
of quasi-proportional mechanisms and then using this algorithm, we present a
family of plots showing the quality of the mechanisms.
6.1 A polynomial-time algorithm for equilibrium computation
In [6], Even Dar et. al. describe a natural process that converges to a Nash
equilibrium in every socially concave game. This method is useful for computing
Nash equilibrium of the all-pay and winner-pay auctions. The process considered
is known as no-regret dynamics. Informally, a buyer’s update process is said to
have no-regret, if in the long-run, it attains an average utility which is not sig-
nificantly worse than that of the best fixed action in hindsight (in the context of
auctions, the best fixed bid). Even Dar et. al. show that if every buyer uses an
update process with no-regret property, in a repeated socially concave game, the
joint average action profile converges to a Nash Equilibrium. Many efficient al-
gorithms for attaining the no-regret property (also known as no-external-regret),
exist [20,1,12]. In order to compute a Nash equilibrium of the all-pay auction,
and the winner-pay auction, one could simulate the process of running a no-
regret algorithm for every buyer that participates in the auction. The rate at
which the average vector of bids converges to Nash equilibrium, depends on the
vector λ, which existence is guaranteed in property 1. In particular, there exists
no-regret algorithms (e.g., [20]), such that the rate of convergence to Nash equi-
librium, for the quasi-proportional mechanisms, is O( n√
t
P
j∈A vj
vmin
), (I.e., at time
t of the simulation process, the average bids vector is an ǫt-Nash equilibrium,
where ǫt = O( n√
t
P
j∈A vj
vmin
). Algorithm 1 describes the simulation of running si-
multaneous no-regret for every buyer, where the actual no-regret algorithm used
is GIGA [20].
6.2 Numerical Revenue Computation
In this section, we present numerical results for the revenue of the all-pay and
winners-pay quasi-proportional auctions with different weight functions and dif-
ferent number of buyers. Figures 1-4 describe the revenue as a function of the
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium bids for the quasi-
proportional auction.
Input: a vector v = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}.
Output: an ǫ-Nash Equilibrium, b1, . . . , bn.
b0 ← (1, 1, . . . , 1)
for t = 1 to T = O(n
ǫ
P
j∈A vj
vmin
) do
for all i ∈ A do
yti ← bt−1i + 1√t ∂∂bi ui(b)
if yti > vi then
bti ← vi
else
bti ← max(yti , 0)
end if
end for
end for
return bT
highest value for the item, over all the bidders, denoted by α. Figure 1 describes
the revenue in an all-pay auction with two bidders — one bidder has a ‘high’
value α ≥ 1, and the other bidder has a value of 1. We consider two versions of
the all-pay auctions. In the first, we used a weight function w(z) =
√
z, and in
the second we used a weight function w(z) = z
1
4 . Next, in Figure 2, we consider
the same setting as in Figure 1, for the winners-pay auction. The revenue in equi-
librium is presented for three different versions of the winners-pay auction: The
lowest curve describes the winner pay auction with the linear weight function
w(z) = z. The middle curve describes the revenue when the weight function is
w(z) =
√
z and the upper curve describes the revenue when the weight function
is w(z) = z1/4.
In Figures 3, and 4 we study numerically the revenue in a winners-pay auction
when the number of bidders varies from n = 2 to n = 5. The bidders’ private
values are such that a single bidder has a high value α ≥ 1, and the other n− 1
bidders have a low value of 1. Each curve in Figures 3,4 describes the revenue in
equilibrium as a function of α, and each different curve corresponds to a different
number n of bidders. Figure 3 and 4 differ in the weight function used: in Figure
3 we used w(z) = z, and in Figure 4 we used w(z) =
√
z. In Theorem 5, we show
that the revenue in a winners-pay auction, with values profile (α, 1, 1, . . . , 1)
asymptotically goes to 0, as the number of bidders with value 1 tends to∞. It is
interesting however to notice that in both Figures 3 and 4, while the number of
bidders is kept relatively small, the revenue actually increases with the number
of low-value bidders.
7 Concluding Remarks
We study a natural class of quasi-proportional allocation mechanisms. Combined
with all-pay or winner-pay methods, this gives a simple prior-free auction mech-
anism without any reserve prices. Our analytical and experimental study shows
the revenue under various quasi-proportional functions in equilibrium, and we
showed existence of a unique Nash equilibrium that can also be computed ef-
ficiently. We believe quasi-proportional mechanisms will find applications and
a deeper understanding of their properties will be useful. An interesting open
question is to design an auction for a single item that achieves a total rev-
enue of constant factor of α = maxi vi in equilibria. We proved that simple
quasi-proportional mechanisms show promising revenue properties in equilibria,
however none of our mechanisms achieve a constant approximation factor of α
(off by at least facor logα). A main open problem is to design a mechanism for
a single item that achieves a constant factor of α in equilibria while not losing
much in the efficiency of the allocation. Also as we discussed in Section 5.2, the
promising revenue properties of quasi-proportional mechanisms for small num-
ber of buyers disappears as the number of buyers tends to ∞. An interesting
open question is to modify the mechanism to ensure good revenue properties
when many buyers are in the system. A simple idea is that for any number of
bidders, the auctioneer runs a quasi-proportional mechanism among the highest
two bids. One hopes such mechanisms have good revenue properties, however,
we can show that such mechanisms may not admit any pure Nash equilibria.
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Fig. 1. Revenue from equilibrium bids in an all-pay auction with two bidders with
values α, and 1 respectively. The lower curve describes an all-pay auction with weight
function w(x) =
√
x. The upper curve describes an all-pay auction with weight function
w(x) = x1/4.
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Fig. 2. Revenue from equilibrium bids in a winners-pay auction with two bidders with
values α, and 1 respectively. The lower, middle, and upper curves describes a winners-
pay auction with weight functions w(x) = x, w(x) =
√
x, and w(x) = x1/4 respectively.
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Fig. 3. A winners-pay auction with weight w(x) = x, and value profile (α, 1, . . . , 1).
The curves from lowest to highest describe the revenue when the number of bidders
with value 1 is 1,2,3,4 respectively
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Fig. 4. A winners-pay auction with weight w(x) =
√
x, and value profile (α, 1, . . . , 1).
The curves from lowest to highest describe the revenue when the number of bidders
with value 1 is 1,2,3,4 respectively.
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A Proof Sketch of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof follows a similar line to that of Theorem 2. Here, we give a
proof sketch. We start by taking the derivative of the utility function,
∂
∂bi
u1(b1, b2) = − v1 − b1
2(
√
b1 +
√
b2)2
+
v1 − b1
2(
√
b1 +
√
b2)
√
b1
−
√
b1√
b1 +
√
b2
∂
∂bi
u2(b1, b2) = − v2 − b2
2(
√
b1 +
√
b2)2
+
v2 − b2
2(
√
b1 +
√
b2)
√
b2
−
√
b2√
b1 +
√
b2
Assigning b1 ≡ t21 and b2 ≡ t22, and re-ordering we get that in equilibrium:
t1 =
2t32
−v1 + 3t22
t2 =
2t31
−v2+3t21
Assuming that the lower value is v1 = 1, the proof continues by showing a
lower bound on t1, which in return is used for showing that t2 = O(v
1/3
2 ).
B Revenue for other functions.
Theorem 6. For the function w(x) = log(x + 1) and for both all-pay and
winners-pay mechanisms, the revenue of the equilibrium for two buyers with
values 1, α where α >> 1 is at most cα
log2 α
for a constant c.
Proof. Using Equation 5.1 for all-pay mechanism, we get that for w(x) = log(x+
1), vi =
σ2
(σ−w(bi))w(bi). Let the equilibrium be (b
∗
1, b
∗
2). Thus, for the first buyer,
α =
(b∗1 + 1)[log(b
∗
1 + 1) + log(b
∗
2 + 1)]
2
log(b∗2 + 1)
.
Since, b∗2 ≤ v2 = 1, we know that log(b∗2 + 1) ≤ 1, and thus
α ≥ (b
∗
1 + 1) log
2(b∗1 + 1)
log(b∗2 + 1)
≥ (b∗1 + 1) log2(b∗1 + 1).
Therefore, for a constant c, b∗1 ≤ cαlog2 α .
Similarly, for winners-pay mechanism, using Equation 5.2 for w(x) = log(x+
1), we observe that
α = b∗1 +
log b∗1 + 1[log(b
∗
1 + 1) + log(b
∗
2 + 1)](b
∗
1 + 1)
log(b∗2 + 1)
.
And since b∗2 ≤ v2 = 1, we can easily show that b∗1 ≤ cαlog2 α .
Remark 1. Using function w(x) = log(log(x + 1) + 1), one can prove an upper
bound for the revenue of α
log(α) log log2(α)
. More generally, let w be the function
of k consecutive application of log function (i.e, w(x) = log(. . . (log(log(x+1)+
1)+1)+1)), be denoted by w(x) = log(k)(x), then we can show that the revenue
is at most
α
log(α) log log(α) . . . f (k−2)(α)f (k−2)(α)f (k))2(α).
C Proof Sketch of Theorem 5
Proof. We analyze the winners-pay mechanism first. Because of the valuation
vector, we know that bi = bj for i, j 6= 1, we can set B = b1 and b = bi for i 6= 1.
Therefore, using Equation 5.2 and the fact that σ = σ(b) = w(B) + (n− 1)w(b),
we get
α = bi +
w(bi)σ
w′(bi)(σ − w(bi))
1 = b+
w(b)(w(B) + (n− 1)w(b))
w′(bi)(w(B) + (n− 1)w(b))
Substituting, w(x) = xγ and w′(x) = γxγ−1, as n→∞, the second equation
above implies that b ∼= γγ+1 .
Using the above equations, by substituting one can show that as α is fixed
and n→∞, B = O(α), and thus the revenue from this mechanism is
w(B)B
w(B) + (n− 1)w(b) +
w(B)B
w(B) + (n− 1)w(b) = Θ(1).
Using equation 5.1 and by setting B = b1 and b = bi for i 6= 1, one can
perform similar computations and show that b ∼= γn , and B ∼= α
1
γ
n as n→∞. As
a result, the revenue of this mechanism tends to zero as n tends to ∞ and α is
fixed.
